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COMMENTARY
The failure of Integrated Assessment Models as a response to
‘climate emergency’ and ecological breakdown: the Emperor has
no clothes
Salvi Asefi-Najafabadya, Laura Villegas-Ortizb and Jamie Morganc
aEnvironmental Resources Management, Washington, DC, USA; bWorld Resources Institute, Washington, DC, USA;
cSchool of Economics, Analytics and International Business, Leeds Beckett University, Leeds, UK
ABSTRACT
In this brief commentary we provide some parallel points to complement Steve
Keen’s paper in the recent Globalization’s special forum on ‘Economics and
Climate Emergency’. Keen’s critique of climate and economy Integrated
Assessment Models (IAMs) is wide-ranging, but there is still scope to bring to
the fore the general issues that help to make sense of the critique.
Accordingly, we set out six key inadequacies of IAMs and argue towards the





Emergency; limits to growth
In this brief commentary we provide some parallel points to complement Steve Keen’s paper in the
recent Globalization’s special forum on ‘Economics and Climate Emergency’ (Gills & Morgan,
2020; Keen, 2020). There are now many critiques of Integrated Assessment Models (IAM) and
these range from technical disputes regarding appropriate quantities for variables to more funda-
mental critiques of the assumptions, concepts and purposes of IAMs (for the latter see also Dale,
2018; Hickel, 2018; Murphy, 2018). Keen’s critique encompasses much of this range, but there is
still scope to bring to the fore the general issues that help to make sense of the critique. As
Keen’s paper suggests, IAMs give the impression of being rooted in data, which tends to give
them status as science as well as policy influence in key decision making and advisory circles (gov-
ernments, the IPCC, etc.). Climate and economy focused IAMs are, however, deeply unrealistic in
how they represent Earth and Human systems and the relation between the two. This applies to
what are termed ‘simple’ IAMs, such as ‘DICE’, but also ‘complex’ IAMs (see later).1 By underes-
timating the real consequences of human activity – built into economic structure – IAMs convey
the impression that planetary wide economic growth and thus continued expansion of material and
energy use is feasible (on growth see e.g. Smil, 2019). This distracts from development of alterna-
tives better able to assess the potential future risks of climate change, which would in turn lead to
more appropriate policy responses at a basic societal level. In so far as IAMs promote complacency,
they undermine attempts to inform the public and induce appropriate concern, despite that there
clearly is increasing disquiet being expressed in many quarters regarding Climate Emergency and
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ecological breakdown (for context of arguments for delay see Galbraith, 2020; Lamb et al., 2020).
Moreover, in promoting complacency IAMs disguise what George Monbiot refers to as a ‘grim
truth’ i.e. ‘that the rich are able to live as they do only because others are poor: there is neither
the physical nor the ecological space for everyone to pursue private luxury’. As such, IAMs serve
to reproduce inequality whilst facilitating the reproduction of types of economy that are simply
not sustainable. This must change and making ad-hoc tweaks to standard models to fix some
superficial aspects of shortcomings will not be enough to drive that change.
The need for proper context
For the majority of human history, the long term rate of economic growth per capita was close to
zero. Societies were mostly agricultural and the production processes they sustained depended
partly on rudimentary technologies, such as plows and domesticated animals, but mostly on access
to sunlight, water, and soil nutrients – all factors that are made available through natural cycles in
the Earth’s System. Prosperity has varied as civilizations have risen and fallen, but it wasn’t until
very recently, when humans found a way to harness new forms of energy (i.e. energy that was bur-
ied in the form of fossil fuels) that societies’ populations and economies began to grow continu-
ously and significantly. Since 1800, the world population has grown from one billion to 7.76
billion in 2018 and some projections anticipate 10 billion by the end of the century. The story of
economic growth follows a similar path. It was not until the invention of the steam engine and
the discovery of coal as a source of energy that societies began experiencing rates of economic
growth larger than 0.14%. Between 1500 and 1820, the growth rate of per capita income in Western
Europe was 0.14% – not too different from the growth rate between 1000 and 1500, which was
0.12% (see Chang, 2014).2 And a policy focus on GDP metrics really only came to the fore with
the development of national income accounting and then the dissemination of this after World
War II (Masood, 2016; Spash, 2020). According to theWorld Bank, global GDP was US$ 1.4 trillion
in 1960 and it was US$ 87.6 trillion in 2019. Of course, reference to just the numbers tells us noth-
ing about distribution and responsibility for associated climate effects, it just tells us that there are
more of us affecting more of the planet (modifying land, sea and air). However, if we focus on con-
sumption of resources and carbon emissions, it remains the case that the vast majority of impact is
created by relatively few countries, corporations and people (see Gore, 2020; Heede, 2014).3
In any case, for the last 200 years, the unlocking of energy from fossils has allowed humans to
grow in population and measured ‘wealth’ at a rate beyond that which an ‘unperturbed’ biogeo-
chemical cycle is capable of maintaining (see e.g. Motesharrei et al., 2016). Fossil fuels are reservoirs
of energy and historically have enabled humans to use more energy than is made available to them
in the form of wind, sunlight, fire, and running water. It is by using additional fossil fuel energy
sources that humans have been able to develop economic systems of resource use that have sus-
tained growth at levels well beyond that of previous societies. However, there is no evidence that
they are able to avoid or manage the consequences of doing this. There is no evidence that contem-
porary economies have or are able to in the near future decisively ‘dematerialise’ or transition from
some degree of ‘relative decoupling’ to ‘absolute decoupling’ of economic activity and growth in
material and energy use and associated issues like carbon emissions (see e.g. Fletcher & Rammelt,
2017; Parrique et al., 2019). And it is now widely acknowledged that we have surpassed the Earth’s
capacity to restore and repair the damage imposed by this kind of increasing human activity (e.g.
Ripple et al., 2020). Current trends in extinction rates, coral reef decay, ocean pollution and acid-
ification, overfishing, deforestation, air pollution and climate change point towards critical
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tensions, if not collapse (e.g. Ceballos et al., 2017; Lenton et al., 2020). Increased social strife around
the world can be considered another sign of unsustainable growth pathways (e.g. Abel et al., 2019;
Gleick, 2014). Ultimately ecological damage and accelerated climate change and its consequences
are a signal that economic growth and likely population growth are not realistic options if we are to
avoid dangerous Earth System transitions.
The recent IPCC Global Warming of 1.5°C report (IPCC, 2018) and the deficits published in the
annual UNEP Emissions Gap reports (see Christensen & Olhoff, 2019) have placed greater pressure
on governments across the world to immediately increase investment in mitigation and adaptation
and take more urgent action to reduce emissions – and this has resulted in further negotiations via
the COP process and the UNFCCC and different countries are now beginning to announce they
will aim for ‘net zero’ emissions by mid-century (though currently statutory commitments, detailed
plans and implementation are mainly lacking and there is considerable scepticism regarding what
‘net’might mean). Still, it is increasingly clear that more delay and gradual incremental change will
be insufficient. Moreover, it remains the case that the IPCC approach to change is itself not
sufficiently ambitious. This brings us to the subject of Integrated Assessment Models and what fol-
lows is best read in the context of Keen’s paper (Keen, 2020). IPCC reports include various ‘simu-
lated scenarios’ generated from IAMs.4 Whilst there are many uses for IAMs we are mainly
interested in those used to estimate the ‘social cost of carbon’ and to evaluate alternative abatement
policies. As Keen makes abundantly clear, although these seem rigorous and are technically
impressive in their apparent complexity, they are fundamentally flawed. In principle IAMs explore
how the ‘Human System’ (essentially economic activity) affects and interacts with the Earth System,
but the assumptions used to construct IAMs are unrealistic and the relation between Human Sys-
tems and the Earth System is unrepresentative. Ultimately IAMs are a symptom, a reflection of an
even more profound problem with how social planners, policymakers, and global political and
economic powers are dictating the way in which natural and human resources are managed (or
mismanaged).
In the following section, we identify several major flaws in IAMs. Conclusions from IAMs about
the impact of a warming scenario are unreliable, misleading, and founded on oversimplifying
assumptions. Although much of the discussion will only focus on ‘simple’ IAMs, the main criticism
applies also to what are termed ‘complex’ IAMs (see below).
Key inadequacies of IAMs
1. The rational expectations assumption
IAMs incorporate mainstreammacroeconomic models and these are typically constructed using an
assumption of ‘rational expectations’. In general, this means models represent individual com-
ponents of the system as optimizing agents with full information of the system and with a clear
‘decision rule’. This facilitates tractability, ensuring definite outcomes. Real behaviour in human
societies is different, participants have limited knowledge, diverse information, interests and motiv-
ations and systems are emergent, organic and evolving. These restrictions have important impli-
cations for the economic outcomes of the models.5 Ultimately, IAMs impose unrealistic
assumptions about behaviour and therefore represent the wrong system. Put another way, they
model human systems inadequately but do so because this leads to equilibrium solutions and
optimality when equations are solved. This leads to further practical problems of expression
built into the mathematics and coding.
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2. Lack of real complexity
IAMs are limited in their capacity to incorporate complexities, nonlinearities, non-convexities, tip-
ping points, and uncertainties: all typical features of climate change. Often, IAMs are formulated in
an optimization language such as GAMS (General Algebraic Modelling System) or AMPL (A
Mathematical Programming Language). At the same time, IAMs leave many ‘degrees of freedom’
for the modeller. This means the modeller has great leeway in choosing the functional forms and
parameter values used in the model. Clearly, this can (and has in many high profile cases) led to
radically varying conclusions regarding the implied ‘social cost of carbon’ (SCC) and ‘optimal’
abatement policy. For example, Nordhaus (2008) finds that optimal abatement should initially
be very limited, consistent with a SCC of around $20 or less, while Stern (2008) concludes that
an immediate and drastic cut in emissions is necessary, consistent with a SCC above $200. Whilst
survey research indicates that many modellers prefer higher values for costs (and lower discount
rates) than Nordhaus (Drupp et al., 2020), his work as Nobel prizewinner is extremely influential
and the more important point is that there is no decisive (objective) determinant of the values used
in these models.
In general, modelling offers an overly optimistic future, predicting the impact of climate change to
be only a few points decrease in otherwise expanding world GDP per capita by the end of the cen-
tury – even for high levels of warming. In some models, even a global temperature increase above +5
degrees Celsius would cost less than 7% of the world’s future GDP (see Nordhaus, 1994; Roson & Van
der Mensbrugghe, 2012). This leads to complacency – statements such as ‘a century of climate change
is about as good/bad for welfare as a year of economic growth’ (see Tol, 2018). Moreover, there is a
major disjuncture here with the consensus amongst Climate Scientists and Earth System scientists
regarding the nature and significance of changes in climate and ecosystems (Lenton et al., 2020).
This raises deep questions regarding the integration of climate science into IAMs.
3. ‘Integrated’ does not mean what you think it means
‘Simple’ IAMs, such as ‘DICE’, are narrowly focused, they set up some way to measure cost and
benefits of climate change – typically the relationship between some measure of economic activity
and emissions i.e. the ‘social cost of carbon’. As such, they do not model more complex economic
and climate processes. ‘Complex’ IAMs use additional linked modules representing the global
economy, as well as its energy, land, and climate systems to look at energy technologies, energy
use choices, land-use changes, and the societal trends behind emissions of greenhouse gases
(GHG). There are numerous identified conceptual or technical problems with these. For example,
the use of a climate sensitivity parameter, dubious presuppositions such as a continual optimal rate
of fossil fuel extraction, and dubious assumptions such as infinite potential sinks for carbon and
instantaneous effects of emissions reduction policy. Perhaps the most fundamental problem is
that in IAMs Earth and Human Systems do not feedback on each other. The use of terms such
as ‘coupling’ (focused on ‘uni-coupling’) tends to obscure this deep lack of realism.
For example, in reality, changes in climate hazards can trigger human migration across different
regions of the world, which in turn will have effects on land use, water availability, deforestation,
desertification, and so on. Also, climate change may eventually make certain areas of the world hos-
tile living places based on temperature rises leading to falling economic output, population decline,
social inequality and political crises. However, these complex feedbacks are not adequately
expressed in IAMs. Instead they depend on exogenous projections fed into the models. This lack
of realistic feedback means IAMs are unable to accurately estimate the economic cost of environ-
mental degradation (including climate change). They are unable to adequately represent human
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responses to changing climate and ecological processes. This also affects complementary scenario
analyses, and these too are unable to represent realistic human responses to environmental impacts,
including in regional economic activity. These may take forms in reality that are assumed away in
the majority of simulated exercises, notably responses leading to real collapses in economic activity
and thus measured GDP. The general problem is revealed by the form that Representative Concen-
tration Pathways, or RCPs, and Shared Socioeconomic Pathways, or SSPs take. These are set out in
IPCC reports and population distribution and population density projections from current IAMs
are exactly the same for a scenario with sustainable development (SSP1) and a scenario with fossil-
fuel intensive development (SSP5) (see Asefi-Najafabady et al., 2018).6 This is obviously implausi-
ble, revealing a lack of sensitivity to the specifics of possible processes (the real evolution of a
mutually dependent system). Clearly, current analytical approaches are unfit for impact evaluation
or adaptation and mitigation planning – at the local and global level (given the obvious scalability
problem). To reiterate a point made earlier, the apparent rigor and technical complexity of IAMs
convey a sense of authority that is unfounded.
4. The use of a ‘representative agent’ in the economic model
We have already suggested that IAMs model human systems inadequately, but there is more to this.
The economy that IAMs model is built from a kind of economic agent whose behaviour bears no
resemblance to real people, real people whose actual activity would (will) in reality play a key role in
how an economy and society evolve in the context of a changing climate. In a simple IAM, much
like in any other mainstream macroeconomic model, there is, for the purpose of simplicity, only
one agent, the ‘representative agent’. This agent is supposed to represent the economic decisions
of all actors in the global economy. Since this economic agent makes all decisions in the economy,
she effectively determines who gets what (the distribution and, since she is ‘representative’, all
wealth is effectively equally distributed in the model – between herself). By implication, insti-
tutional contexts and thus variation in and significance of government and governance decisions
are rendered irrelevant by this simplification. As a representative agent she stands in for both a sim-
plified consumer and producer.
In reality, of course, consumers have different traditions and habits, religions, income levels,
access to resources, and risk preferences. Producers also vary in size from sole traders to global cor-
porations, and so vary in market sector, use of technologies and a whole host of other issues expres-
sive of power and influence both economic and political. Moreover, real people are not narrowly
focused optimizing calculative economically ‘rational’ entities. They are not ‘consumers’ or ‘produ-
cers’ in this reductive sense and yet a simplified economic agent is basic to the agent as both con-
sumer and producer in the form of a mathematical ‘function’.
5. The economic agent as consumer: discounts that shouldn’t count
Real people bear no resemblance to the consumer as decisionmaker in a discounted utility or pre-
ference function for the kind of agent found in the models. For the agent in the function ‘satisfac-
tion’ is derived from only two activities: consumption and leisure. Effectively, the agent maximizes
her ‘welfare’ through the value placed on current consumption (or leisure). She rationally prefers
more to less and, rather than delay, she derives more satisfaction from instantaneous rather than
future consumption (‘discounting’ the future merely determines the relative weight placed on
the present compared to the future and this agent is incapable of attaching meaning to projects
or goals as ‘dreams’). Here, experience of the world is as a pure processor of all available ‘infor-
mation’, but as a fully equipped optimizer she cannot be persuaded in or more importantly against
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her own best interest, she cannot be misinformed through ideology or manipulated through mar-
keting. In this model world, there is implied foresight regarding a known future and no true or fun-
damental ‘uncertainty’, and she is always in or tending to an ‘equilibrium’ position (a curious term
in so far as a representative agent applies).
Moreover, in ‘assessing’ consumption no attention is paid by the agent to the type of good or
service produced, where it is produced and how it is produced – whether it involves practices
that are environmentally and socially harmful, whether the supply chain operates via adverse incor-
poration, modern slavery, human rights abuse and/or in undemocratic places. This agent does not
hold moral views that prevent her over-consuming. Nor is this agent capable of kindness, generos-
ity, or compassion towards others – not only because there are no others, but also because even if
there were others, she would not derive any ‘satisfaction’ from any of these activities. She is, how-
ever, capable of ‘risk aversion’, but in the models this is a constant, which means it does not change
based on level of wealth.
Clearly, all this is deeply problematic in so far as the agent is an amoral unit making brute cal-
culations in an amoral economy, which itself lacks adequate mutual relation to the environment on
which she depends. Learning and evolution play no real role here despite that models run as simu-
lations. Nowhere is this more obvious than when making decisions with inter-generational conse-
quences. A discount rate in an IAM is a way to ‘distribute’ the generational wealth gap (and we will
return later to this idea of ‘wealth’). Having a positive discount rate means a combination of three
things: (1) the agent values her own well-being over the well-being of descendants, (2) She dis-
counts the wealth of future generations because she expects them to be wealthier, and (3) there
is some reason why it is not ‘optimal’ in the model to transfer some well-being onto future gener-
ations. Point one introduces a tacit utilitarian and potentially selfish variant of individualism into
the agent despite the amorality of agents in other respects, whilst points two and three are incon-
sistent and likely unfounded if our economies continue to operate along the grounds presupposed
by the models, since those models legitimate destructive expansionary economies by mis-
representing their real consequences. It is not a given that future generations will be better off in
a climate and ecologically damaged future and so there are in fact many morally rational reasons
to engage in ‘transfer’ (whilst again acknowledging that even the language of this seems odd to any-
one less transactional than a mainstream economist). It may be the case that discounting makes
some sense for some purposes and especially over short time horizons, but not when considering
the fate of the species.
Discount rates have been a major source of distraction and delay over the decades, but in so far
as they have influence it is important to consider their implications – the higher they are then the
more the present is valued over the future.7 A recent essay in Time Magazine attempts to express
the weirdness of the calculation by drawing on the work of the Oxford moral philosopher Derek
Parfit (Walsh, 2019). At a discount rate of 5% annually, one death next year is more important
than a billion deaths in 500 years. Or in monetary terms, with a 5% discount rate, it would be
worth spending no more than $2200 today in order to try to prevent US$ 87 trillion in damages
in 500 years. This US$ 87 trillion is equivalent to global GDP in 2019. The numbers matter less
here than the absurdity of, in effect, thinking about what the future is ‘worth’ in this way (for
Parfit it led to unpleasant consequentialist conclusions about the value of a human). According
to this logic we would be prepared to spend less than what a couple of expensive computers
might cost in order to secure economic activity on a scale currently seen for the whole planet. A
typical IAM uses a 3% discount rate. For reference, the climate-change denying Trump adminis-
tration has used an annual discount rate of 7% for its analysis of the social cost of carbon.
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6. The economic agent as producer: the damage done by damage functions
The economic agent as producer is equally problematic. In a simple model, the agent produces only
one aggregate or composite good that represents all possible goods and services in the global econ-
omy. There is only one way to produce this good and it is to use Capital and Labor drawing on
available technology. This single composite good/sector typically takes a neoclassical ‘Constant
Elasticity of Substitution’ functional form, though this can be relaxed and more sectors can be
added to the model.8 Perhaps more important is the role of technology in the model and how
environmental degradation affects production. Besides the production function, there are two fac-
tors that enter the production decision: technology and a penalty term that represents ‘lost pro-
duction’ due to environmental degradation. In the models, technological advancement is
exogenous and there are no delays in its impact on production.9 Exogeneity essentially means
that technology is not an induced or learned response to cumulative environmental consequences
– deliberate investment in R&D to invent more fuel-efficient machines, or new methods to drill
non-conventional sources of oil and gas, carbon capture, development of renewables, etc.
New technologies in IAMs simply appear (at a given rate) and impact the entire production
composite instantly and uniquely. Moreover, it is only through technology that the system
moves forward. Production does not involve ‘learning’ to use capital and labour differently,
decisions cannot involve consequences of education or law – doing more with less, doing less
with less or any other range of changes to the social arrangement of production. There is no pre-
sumption of response in these terms, but production is the major way in which IAMs give the
impression (not the reality) of responsiveness to ecological and climate effects via the penalty
term for environmental degradation’s effect on production – the so-called damage function. As
with discount rates, the construction of the function is conceptually dubious and the values used
are highly disputable. The damage function reduces the output level by some fraction that suppo-
sedly reflects how natural conditions reduce productive capacity. Damage functions have been
heavily criticized for their lack of empirical or theoretical foundations.
The typical damage function only takes mean global temperature into account. As Keen shows
and others have before him, the values and calibrations used in the models are easily manipulated
(and even some of those who construct IAMs acknowledge this, see Keen, 2020; Pindyck, 2013,
2017; Pottier, 2016; Weitzman, 2011). Formally, the penalty term only affects the output level
and not output growth. This means that ‘damage’ amounts to some reduction in that output
level as an economy expands. This is quite different than allowing global temperature increases
to have permanent impacts through time. And more fundamentally it is quite different than the
more comprehensive approach to a system of embedded measurement of throughput pioneered
by ecological economists (see Spash, 2017). Furthermore, the probability distributions that stand
behind damage functions do not allow for ‘fat tails’ or high impact climate events. More fundamen-
tally, the whole approach does not allow for the basic uncertainty inherent to complex evolutionary
processes – a situation where it makes less sense to rely on probability distributions for degrees of
precision and more on commonsense prudential conduct, based on a deeper understanding of sys-
tems, sub-systems, structures and tendencies (IAM use is thus typically quite different in context
than the approach pioneered in early works, like the Limits to Growth,Meadows et al., 1972). Over-
all, the use of a damage function is profoundly misleading if policymakers take the output from
popular IAMs as guidance for policy action. Costs from climate change and ecological breakdown
tend to be radically underestimated and benefits from investment in mitigation and adaptation (as
well as social redesign to just stop doing things that have clear adverse cumulative consequences)
tend to be woefully underappreciated.
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Conclusion
It should be clear that the IAM Emperor has ‘no clothes’ and that we need different attire. In
addition to Keen’s essay, these are issues explored across the various other essays in the special
forum on Climate Emergency, and of course, in many other places (e.g. Hickel & Kallis, 2019).
It should also be clear that IAMs play a key role in distracting attention from the feasibility of
societies and economies built around the assumption of limitless economic growth. Historical
trends of natural resource depletion show that economic growth is no longer sustainable. Yet,
the mainstream narrative, even among some scientists (climate, and environmental scientists
included), is failing to embrace the idea that the core force driving our current environmental pro-
blems is limitless economic growth. When leaders and experts claim the global economy is grow-
ing, what they call growth does not really account for the depletion of natural resources or the
environmental damage that industrialization and superfluous consumption tied to obsolescence
and ‘lifestyles’ (which are available to relatively few but offered as an aspiration for all) are causing
to the entire planet. In any case, the purpose of societies should not be just to grow in the sense of
becoming materially richer based on some reductive concept of GDP (and there are of course many
alternatives to this measurement). And whilst reducing carbon emissions is merely one step that
must be taken to address climate change, it is far from sufficient to resolve catastrophic planet-
wide ecological consequences. It is a disturbing idea that getting our economic accounting systems
to recognize environmental costs and benefits is not primarily an issue of data quality: measure-
ment systems tell as much about the motives of their designers as they do about what is being
measured (Masood, 2016). Failing to account for environmental damages only means increased
economic growth is convenient for those designing the accounting system.
Countries in the global North are not genuinely more sustainable in ecological or climatological
terms in so far as they have transferred polluting industries to ‘developing’ countries such as China
and India. This transfer of low-tech and polluting industries has nowmade China the world’s biggest
polluter (see Smith, 2016).10 Overwhelmedwith pollution, China is now transferring some of its own
industrial pollution to other countries.11 The level of irony in this story is epic and the message is
clear, transfers and technological change alone cannot solve planetary-scale problems if undifferen-
tiated and continuous economic growth remains the basic premise of our economic system, since
this has inevitable consequences for continued material and energy overuse. This must change
and it seems this is something that civil society around the world increasingly recognizes, despite
the policy drag created by IAMs. For example, and as the Covid-19 pandemic also illustrates, the
USA has had to contend with the weaponization of science for ideological ends and this is very evi-
dent in the case of partisan divides on climate change. But partisanship only goes so far and in a
recent Pew Research Center survey, over 74% of American adults agreed that ‘the country should
do whatever it takes to protect the environment’, compared with 23% who said ‘the country has
gone too far in its efforts to protect the environment’.12 Forest fires, droughts, floods and hurricanes,
it seems, are becoming more persuasive than complacent political rhetoric, but more needs to be
done to develop and propagate real solutions and ‘just transitions’ (Newell & Simms, 2020).
Notes
1. ‘DICE’ stands for ‘Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and the Economy. The regional version is
referred to as ‘RICE’.
2. Note Chang’s work has become a subject of critique by Clive Spash because of his lack of attention to
limits to growth.
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3. The richest 26 people in the world possess the same wealth as the poorest half of humanity, and they are
also disproportionate emitters of GHG (the top 10% of the world’s top earners produce almost half of
the world’s carbon emissions).
4. To be clear, the IPCC and various modelers recognize that IAMs can be problematic but still continue
to use them. See, https://www.carbonbrief.org/qa-how-integrated-assessment-models-are-used-to-
study-climate-change
5. For example, a standard result of mainstream models is the full employment of labor in the economy:
meaning that anyone who is willing and able to work can find a job and unemployment is zero.
6. And see also Asefi-Najafabady et al. (2014).
7. For classic argument see Nordhaus (1991).
8. And of course, mirroring the utility function, work is a disutility rather than a complex phenomenon
constituted through social relations and providing a source of meaning and status.
9. Although some IAMs try to model these delays by imposing a logistic function on how new technol-
ogies are adopted.
10. However, Smith argues that whilst it is true China produces emissions on behalf of other countries,
China also has its own internal dynamics of ecological and climate effects (the role of the CCP), see
also Smith (2020).
11. See: https://www.npr.org/2019/04/29/716347646/why-is-china-placing-a-global-bet-on-coal
12. A support rate of 74% is far greater than the support received by the Civil Rights movement in America
in the 1960s. A nationwide Gallup poll in February 1965 found 26% of Americans citing civil rights as a
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